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Crude Oil Price Controls: Their Purpose and
Impact*
JOHN KRAFT**
MARK RODEKOHR***
I. INTRODUCTION
Crude oil price controls are a part of the great body of
federal and state regulations which govern the activities of the
petroleum industry. Price controls are a rather recent addition
to four decades of petroleum industry regulations, which gener-
ally have fit into one of the following classifications: market
demand prorationing plans, oil import quotas, allocation pro-
grams, and price controls. The market demand prorationing
plan and oil import programs were designed to raise crude oil
prices above their competitive levels, thus stabilizing prices
and transferring funds from consumers to producers. Crude oil
and product price regulations have the opposite effect; i.e.,
they are designed to keep prices below world levels and transfer
income from producers to consumers.
The current regulations prevent owners of lower cost oil
with fixed production costs from seeking the world price of
crude oil as established by the Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC). Under this scheme, controls pre-
vent crude oil and petroleum product prices from reflecting the
OPEC price of crude. This lower-than-market domestic price
of petroleum encourages demand, reduces domestic produc-
tion, and increases imports of foreign crude as the marginal
source of supply to satisfy domestic demand, and thus in-
creases the United States' dependence on an uncertain supply
of crude oil. The evidence suggests that these regulations, cou-
pled with environmental restrictions, create a negative impact
on the supply of petroleum in the United States.' Prorationing
plans have diverted investment toward development drilling,
* The views expressed herein are those the authors and should not be taken as
representing the views of either of their employers.
** Program Manager for Public Policy and Regulation, National Science Founda-
tion. B.S., 1966, St. Bonaventure University; M.A., 1970, University of Pittsburgh;
Ph.D., 1971, University of Pittsburgh.
* ** Economist, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration.
B.S., 1970, University of Delaware; M.A., 1972, University of Colorado; Ph.D., 1974,
University of Colorado.
1. See, e.g., D. Born & M. RUSSEL, U.S. ENERGY PoucY 4 (1975).
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away from exploration in highly risky but potentially more
productive petroleum regions or basins. Together, prorationing
and import controls have discouraged necessary investment in
domestic refining capacity. Prorationing, by restricting pro-
duction, has limited the refiners' sources of domestic feed-
stocks, and import limitations have restricted the refiners' abil-
ity to substitute foreign for domestic feedstocks. Likewise, im-
port quotas have reduced competition and efficiency in domes-
tic production, since import quotas are set so that they cannot
replace domestic production, a situation which has allowed
U.S. producers to exercise effective monopoly power through
complete control of both domestic and foreign supplies. With-
out an import quota, the ability of prorationing to restrict out-
put and allow crude oil prices to rise above their competitive
levels would be neutralized by the substitution of imported
crude for domestic production.
Price controls on petroleum tend to weaken any incentive
by the industry to respond to increased demand for products.
Regulated natural gas markets have discouraged producers
from exploring for new fields in the face of declining gas re-
serves. Since natural gas and petroleum are joint products,
price controls on both have contributed to their declining re-
serve positions.
Under any energy program, the average price of domestic
crude oil is regulated to be lower than the price of imported
crude oil, and as such, the average refiner acquisition cost for
domestic crude oil is considerably below that of imported
crude. Under each of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter energy pro-
grams, phased decontrol of domestic crude oil prices has been
deemed preferable to immediate decontrol. Since the domestic
production of crude oil is no longer sufficient to meet domestic
demand, the marginal barrel of crude oil needed to satisfy this
increased demand must come from foreign sources.
From the standpoint of market efficiency, regulations are
usually considered harmful in that they reduce production,
distort market mechanisms, and fail to account for the interac-
tion of supply and demand. For equity reasons, however, regu-
lations are often necessary to protect consumers, assign costs
to externalities, and preserve national security. This paper will
discuss the efficiency aspects of crude oil regulations and their
consequent impacts on price, domestic production, market dis-
tortions, and imports. The study will be divided into three
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parts: Pre-Embargo Controls, Post-Embargo Controls, and an
Economic Analysis of Controls.
HI. PRE-EMBARGO CONTROLS
As demonstrated by MacAvoy 2 and Mead,3 the crude oil
segment of the petroleum industry has been subject to govern-
ment regulation since the 1930's, though the purpose of the
regulations has changed dramatically over the years. Current
regulations are designed to restrain prices and transfer industry
rents4 from the producers of crude oil to the consumers of petro-
leum products. On the other hand, the earliest regulations
transferred funds from the consumers to the producers by re-
stricting supply and thereby stabilizing prices at higher than
open market levels.
A. Domestic Prorationing Schemes
In the 1930's, the major petroleum-producing states joined
together to develop a system of prorationing under which any
given producer was allowed to produce only a percentage of the
maximum efficient rate of recovery from a given reservoir. 5 In
1935 the major producing states executed the Interstate Oil
Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas.' The prorationing plans
encouraged in the compact were designed to prevent overin-
vestment in oil wells and overproduction from any given reser-
voir, with state agencies setting the allowable rates of produc-
tion. Many states have continued to employ alternative forms
of these maximum efficient recovery (MER) plans over the last
four decades, and while no single plan has ever worked flaw-
lessly, MER's have helped to limit the wasteful production and
wild price fluctuations which characterized the early 1930's.
Obviously, the prorationing plans fixed prices and elimi-
nated competition among producers. If permissible production
rates were established at too low a level, refiners would com-
2. FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION REGULATION (P. MacAvoy ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as MacAvoyl.
3. W. Mead, Petroleum: An Unregulated Industry? ENERGY SUPPLY AND Gov-
ERNMENT POLICY 130-160 (R. Kalter & W. Vogely eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Mead].
4. Rents may be defined as unrealized gains to the owner of a scarce commodity
which is fixed in quantity, whose market value has increased since the owner's procure-
ment.
5. There have been a number of different prorationing plans. The rationale behind
each type is explained in Mead, supra note 3, at 132-48.
6. The U.S. Congress by joint resolution gave its consent to the compact. See J.
Res. of Aug. 27, 1935, Ch. 781, 49 Stat. 939 (1935).
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plain that they were unable to obtain crude at the current
price; the state agency would then either increase the produc-
tion percentages or raise the price of crude. Production in ex-
cess of state-established limits for interstate shipment was pro-
hibited by the Connally Hot Oil Act of 1935.! This state of
affairs was not changed notably by peacetime legislation for
the next twenty-five years.
B. Oil Import Controls
When low cost foreign crude oil threatened prorationing
plans, and thereby the price of domestic crude oil, the Presi-
dent (at the urging of congressmen whose districts were being
affected) established the Mandatory Oil Import Program
(MOIP) of 1959.1 This program set volumetric limits on the
amount of crude oil and related products which could be im-
ported. While the regulations and operation of MOIP under-
went several changes, the effect was to insulate the price of
domestic crude oil from lower world prices. Under this program
the quantities of imported oil were rigidly fixed, and the mar-
ginal barrel of crude oil necessary to satisfy domestic demand
was supplied from domestic petroleum sources.
Declining domestic production of crude oil since 1970, cou-
pled with increased demand, has caused the allowable rate of
production under the MER plans to be fixed at 100% by the
appropriate state commissions. With full production now per-
mitted, there no longer exists any excess production capacity
in the domestic petroleum industry; producers may now pro-
vide as much as is profitable to satisfy domestic demand.
Effective May 1, 1973, President Nixon eliminated
MOIP's volumetric limits on oil imports.' The removal of the
quota system exposed a severe shortage of domestic refinery
capacity. Refineries which would have been constructed in the
United States were built abroad instead, since the quota sys-
tem had restricted entry into the United States of foreign crude
7. 15 U.S.C. § 715 (1976).
8. Pres. Proc. No. 3279, 3 C.F.R. 11 (1959-1963 Compilation), reprinted in 19
U.S.C. § 1862 (1976), and in 73 Stat. c25 (1959). For a detailed account of the history
and politics of the mandatory oil import program from 1959-1973, see Mead, supra
note 3, at 148-54.
9. Pres. Proc. No. 4210, 3 C.F.R. 239 (1971-1975 Compilation), reprinted in 87
Stat. 1187 (1973). License fees, however, continued to be charged on imported oil: $0.21
per barrel of crude, and $0.63 per barrel of product.
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oil supplies. In 1973 domestic U.S. refiners were operating at
almost 100% of capacity.
C. Price Controls
The United States' first major peacetime experience with
petroleum price controls occurred with the Nixon Administra-
tion's announcement of a ninety-day wage-price freeze (Phase
One) on August 15, 1971.10 The current crude oil price regula-
tions of the Department of Energy are an extension of the regu-
lations originally promulgated under Phase One. While the
program affected petroleum products as well as crude petro-
leum, the discussion here will focus only on crude oil aspects
of price controls.
Prior to the summer of 1971, there had been gasoline price
wars among the major brand gasoline dealers. Markets, how-
ever, stabilized prior to the establishment of controls, and at
the initiation of the price freeze, gasoline prices charged by oil
company retail outlets were at normal or near-normal levels.
The integrated petroleum companies enjoyed some flexibility
under the freeze. Traditionally, major petroleum companies
had provided bulk purchasers of gasoline and refined products
with discounts below the posted prices. As the discount con-
tracts expired, the suppliers refused to renew them at the dis-
counted level and insisted on selling their petroleum only at the
full posted price. Thus, despite the freeze, these companies in
effect were able to raise their prices. This practice placed a
squeeze on the profits of independent marketers whose prod-
ucts were subject to the freeze but whose inputs were now
purchased at nondiscounted prices. These price distortions
continued into the second stage of the Nixon wage-price pro-
gram.
Phase Two lasted from November 15, 1971 to January 11,
1973."1 Ceiling prices which had been set during the Phase One
freeze became base prices for Phase Two. Under Term Limit
Pricing (TLP) arrangements, companies were allowed to in-
crease prices of their products for a specified period of time,
10. Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. 602 (1971-1975 Compilation), 12 U.S.C. §
1904 n (1976). A detailed account of the regulations and the impact of controls during
the Nixon Administration's Economic Stabilization Program is presented in W. John-
son, The Impact of Price Controls on the Oil Industry: How to Worsen an Energy
Crisis, in ENERGY: THE POLICY ISSUES 100-109 (G. Eppen ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as Johnson).
11. The first announcement of a change in the structure of controls came in Exec.
Order 11,627, 3 C.F.R. 621 (1971-1975 Compilation).
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provided the weighted-average price increases were consistent
with specific cost passthrough and profit margin rules set by
the newly established Price Commission. Companies were al-
lowed to spread price increases in any manner across products
subject to TLP, but were severely limited in adjusting relative
prices for products excluded from TLP arrangements. In the
petroleum industry, three-fourths of the refinery yield was ex-
cluded. For example, crude oil prices were excluded from TLP
agreements if the crude was resold by refineries, while first-sale
prices of crude oil were included in TLP arrangements.
During 1972 and continuing into 1973, shortages of crude
oil and some refined products began to appear. For example,
the controls prohibited price increases on gasoline and number
two home heating oil above their August 1971 price levels.
However, during the summer months, gasoline prices were at
relatively high levels compared to heating oil prices. Since the
refiners believed that heating oil prices would not be allowed
to follow their seasonal pattern and rise during the winter, they
had no incentive to increase their output of heating oil when
the winter months arrived, and shortages began to occur.
Phase Three"2 was the government's response to these and
similar problems; it was to have provided industry with greater
flexibility in conducting business, within fixed price guidelines.
Business was to comply on a voluntary basis with standards for
cost increases contained in the Phase Three regulations; the
Price Commission was abolished and the Cost of Living Coun-
cil was called upon to monitor compliance with the new stan-
dards. As Phase Three began, the combined factors of pent-up
demand pressure for petroleum products, decreasing domestic
crude production, and a worldwide shortage of crude oil re-
sulted in sharp increases in the price of crude oil and products.
On March 8, 1973, however, the Cost of Living Council issued
Special Rule Number One, 3 which reimposed mandatory con-
trols on the twenty-three major companies in the petroleum
industry," and produced an unfortunate set of incentives which
contributed to the shortage of crude in the United States. First,
the rule restricted the ability of the majors to raise prices above
12. See Exec. Order No. 11,695, 3 C.F.R. 741 (1971-1975 Compilation).
13. 38 Fed. Reg. 6284 (1973).
14. These companies had individual sales in excess of $230 million, and in the
aggregate conducted 45% of the industry's sales.
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specified percentages, and prohibited them from increasing
prices if their profits were over specific base period profit mar-
gin levels. Since the largest companies owned and operated
profitable holdings, their profits exceeded the base period lev-
els, and thus they were prohibited from passing on higher for-
eign crude oil costs to their customers. At the same time the
rule enabled smaller refiners to bid up the price of crude oil.
Since the higher price of foreign crude could not be passed on
by the majors, the smaller refineries succeeded in diverting
crude from the majors. A second negative byproduct of Special
Rule Number One arose from the fact that the major U.S.
producers with foreign operations faced a reduction in profits
on refined products if the crude was sold in the United States
and they were at the profit margin constraint. By selling this
crude oil abroad rather than shipping it to the United States,
the majors were able to maximize profits, since foreign sales
were unaffected by the Phase Three rules. This circumstance
further aggravated the shortage of crude oil in the United
States and placed more pressure on crude oil prices, exacerbat-
ing crude shortages to domestic refiners. A crude oil allocation
program eventually was enacted 5 to alleviate the crude shor-
tages created by Special Rule Number One.
Phase 31/2 froze all petroleum prices from June 13, 1973
to August 12, 1973.16 During this period even the increased
prices of imported crude oil could not be passed through to
consumers in the form of higher product prices. Since imported
crude oil prices were rising, this rule effectively stopped all
crude purchases by refiners and eventually produced severe
petroleum product shortages in the fall of 1973.
Phase Four took effect on August 13, 1973, and continued
until December 1973 when all petroleum price controls were
transferred to the Federal Energy Office from the Cost of Liv-
ing Council." The new regulations benefited immensely from
the failings of Phases Two and Three, with their reliance on
controlling only the major companies: now the pricing of petro-
15. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 (EPAA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-
760h (1976), discussed infra.
16. Announced by President Nixon in Exec. Order No. 11,723, 3 C.F.R. 774 (1971-
1975 Compilation).
17. Phase Four regulations were originally set forth in 38 Fed. Reg. 19,462-86
(1973) (proposed), and amended in 38 Fed. Reg. 21,592-613 (1973). Provisions relevant
to crude oil appear at 38 Fed. Reg. 19,481-83 (1973).
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leum and its products by all parts of the industry would be
covered. A two-tiered pricing system was established which
differentiated between controlled "old" oil and uncontrolled
"new" oil. While designed to stabilize the price of crude pro-
duced from existing properties, it also provided an incentive to
producers to seek out higher cost production from new proper-
ties, or to use enhanced recovery techniques to increase produc-
tion from existing properties. 8 "Old" oil was defined as oil
produced from a given property in an amount equal to or less
than the amount produced in the same month of 1972 by that
property. It was subject to price controls fixed at the May 15,
1973 price of crude oil from the given field, plus thirty-five
cents per barrel. The lower tier thus had the effect of prevent-
ing the industry from accruing rents on existing properties.
Uncontrolled "new" oil was defined as production from new
wells on properties not operative in 1972, or production from
1972 properties in excess of 1972 production levels. "Stripper"
oil, from wells producing less than ten barrels per day, was not
subject to controls. In addition, for each new barrel of crude oil
produced on an existing property, a barrel of old oil would be
released from lower tier controls. This "released" oil was free
of controls and was used as an inducement for producers to
increase production above 1972 levels on existing properties.
New and released oil were free to seek the uncontrolled import
price level. Thus, the two-tiered system was designed to in-
crease domestic crude oil production by raising the crude oil
price at the margin for each new barrel of oil, while allowing
the average price for new and old oil to determine refinery
product prices.
Although the two-tiered system did encourage new explo-
ration and development, it created problems for refineries.
Since each refiner did not have access to the same proportions
of controlled and uncontrolled crude oil, the system produced
significant differentials between refiners in ultimate product
prices. Retail gasoline prices in the same city often differed by
as much as twelve cents per gallon."9 The self-sufficient refinery
purchaser had to charge oil into the refinery at the controlled
18. Enhanced recovery techniques are methods of recovering additional energy
from a reservoir by fluid or chemical injections. The oil generated by fluid injections
is called "secondary" oil, while the result of chemical injections is called "tertiary" oil.
19. Johnson, supra note 10, at 110.
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price, and the low controlled prices then had to be carried
through into low product prices. This procedure placed the
uncontrolled crude purchaser at a disadvantage in the product
market, since higher price crude imports were charged into the
refinery at the higher import price and yielded higher priced
refined products. The two-tiered system thus discouraged in-
vestment in expansion of refinery capacity.
III. POST-EMBARGO CONTROLS
The Yom Kippur War of October 1973 resulted in an em-
bargo on the sale of crude oil to the United States by the OPEC
nations. With the threat of a severe shortage of crude oil sup-
plies, the stage was set for implementation of a crude oil alloca-
tion procedure designed to avert the harshest effects to con-
sumers of the impending crude shortage.
A. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA) became
effective on November 27, 1973 and provided for the mandatory
and equitable allocation of crude oil among the nation's refi-
ners on a quarterly basis.20 Under a buy/sell agreement, refiners
having a higher percentage of crude oil supplies than the na-
tional average (in relation to their refining capacity) were re-
quired to resell their crude to refineries with below normal
crude availability. Under the allocation scheme, the Federal
Energy Office (FEO) took over administration of the EPAA
from the Cost of Living Council in December 1973. The effect
of the EPAA was to penalize those companies with preesta-
blished crude supplies and to weaken the market function by
placing FEO in control of crude allocation."
During the period of the embargo (October 1973 through
April 1974), the regulations established under the EPAA re-
mained unchanged. With the end of the embargo in the spring
of 1974, legislation was signed establishing the Federal Energy
Administration (FEA), 2 which was given authority to adminis-
ter the regulations established and formerly administered by
FEO. The only major changes made in the regulations by FEA
in the remainder of 1974 were modifications of the buy/sell
program and creation of a crude oil entitlements program. The
20. 15 U.S.C. § 751-760h (1976).
21. See Mandatory Allocation Regulations amending 10 C.F.R. §§ 200-202 (re-
voked), 205 (added), 210-212 (added), reprinted in 39 Fed. Reg. 1924-1961 (1974).
22. Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-787 (1976).
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original buy/sell program had caused two major problems: (1)
the requirement of crude oil sharing among majors had forced
needless transfers of supplies between majors experiencing
mere short term imbalances, increasing unnecessary bureau-
cratic costs; and (2) disincentives to purchase imported crude
oil, as discussed above. The buy/sell program was modified
on May 14, 1974, to limit the sellers of crude oil to the fifteen
largest refiners, and the buyers to the smaller refiners.2 Some
imported oil disincentives were also addressed.
B. Entitlements Program
In November 1974 the EPAA was supplemented by a
crude oil entitlements program designed to equalize crude oil
costs varying among refiners as a result of the two-tiered price
control system.2 4 Under the program, refiners having crude oil
in excess of the national average were required to purchase
entitlements from refiners having less than the national aver-
age. The purpose of the program was to correct inequities cre-
ated by the earlier price control and allocation procedures; one
intended effect was the creation of a bias favoring smaller refi-
ners. Large OPEC price increases in late 1973 had produced a
tremendous gap between upper and lower tier oil prices. De-
pending on the mix of old, new, and imported oil available to
the refineries, the average price of imports available had con-
tinued to vary considerably. Refineries with more old oil than
the national average were forced to purchase entitlements in
order to use their excess lower tier oil, while those having less
than the average low-cost crude could sell their entitlements.
Small refiners were given additional entitlements as a subsidy
to help them compete with the majors; these entitlements ei-
ther could be sold or used to acquire crude oil at a cost below
the majors' acquisition cost.a The small refiner bias effectively
raised the cost of crude oil to large refiners, whose costs were
obviously key determinants of the final price of refined prod-
ucts. In addition, the bias encouraged the use of smaller, less
efficient refineries.
23. Amendments to 10 C.F.R. §§ 211.61-211.68, 211.71, 212.88 (revoked), 212.94
reprinted in 39 Fed. Reg. 17,288-93 (1974).
24. Amendments to 10 C.F.R. §§ 211.66, 211.67, 212.131, reprinted in 39 Fed. Reg.
42,246-50 (1974).
25. See generally MacAvoy, supra note 2, at 12.
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C. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the Energy
Conservation and Production Act
Current crude oil controls operate under laws passed in
December 1975 and August 1976. The Energy Policy and Con-
servation Act (EPCA) of 1975 provided for the phasing-out of
price regulations on crude oil over a forty-month time period.,
The plan established a fixed national average price for all crude
oil, which the Federal Energy Administration was given power
to adjust by up to 10% per year. Initially, the average price was
set at $7.66 per barrel, which was the share-weighted average
price of old oil at $5.25 per barrel and upper tier oil at $11.28
per barrel. The upper tier included new oil, released oil, and
stripper oil; a third tier not included in the composite existed
for uncontrolled imported oil, which sold for approximately
$13.25 per barrel. Following passage of EPCA, revisions were
made in existing crude regulations to conform to EPCA, in-
cluding elimination of the released oil category and introduc-
tion of a mechanism whereby the base period production level
for a given field was placed on a declining basis to correspond
with the historical decline rate for each field." In addition, the
lease definition was modified to treat new reservoirs developed
on old leases as new property, thereby making them available
for upper tier rather than lower tier prices.,
The Energy Conservation and Production Act (ECPA) of
1976, modified EPCA by exempting stripper oil from upper tier
controls." However, stripper oil supplies were still to be in-
cluded in the calculation of the upper tier price, which pre-
vented the exemption of stripper oil from having an effect on
the share-weighted average price of crude oil remaining con-
trolled. Tertiary oil supplies were exempted from controls and
allowed to sell at the world oil price, but were not included in
the average price.
Current crude oil controls focus on elimination of rents to
owners of lower cost old petroleum, unlike the rules in the pre-
embargo period, which were aimed at holding down prices and
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (1976).
27. FEA began assuming a decline rate of 8% as an average for all fields, based
on analysis of a number of sites.
28. Amendments to 10 C.F.R. §§ 212.72, 212.75, reprinted in 41 Fed. Reg. 36,172-
85 (1976).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6892 (1976).
1979
326 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
forcing producers and refiners to absorb increasing costs. The
current control system prevents domestic crude oil from re-
flecting the OPEC price of crude oil. However, any intended
benefits of the program are not without costs to the industry
and the taxpayer. 30 For the industry there are compliance and
administrative costs, interference with distribution patterns,
and uncertainty as to the direction of future regulation. The
taxpayers bear the costs of increased regulation via higher
prices and reduced efficiency. The various programs discourage
refinery expansion, continue to be biased in favor of less than
optimal refinery utilization, and cause higher marketing costs.
The present controls program is exceedingly complex and diffi-
cult to enforce." Summary comments from other studies illus-
trate these points.
MacAvoy concluded that the costs of today's crude oil reg-
ulations outweigh their benefits: current market conditions
show adequate world supplies of crude and do not warrant
continuation of product pricing and allocation regulations. He
estimated that the petroleum industry pays reporting and
administrative costs for compliance as high as $570 million
annually, while the administrative costs of the program main-
tained by FEA could be costing the taxpayers $47 million per
year.32 In addition, controls could produce longrun inefficien-
cies by encouraging refineries of less than optimal size (small
refiner bias), and inefficiency in the distribution of products.
In analyzing the effects of crude oil controls, Cox and
Wright reached similar conclusions. While they found that the
entitlements program did equalize refiner crude costs, it had
the additional effect of artificially reducing the market price of
products and increasing product demand in the absence of an
appropriate supply response. Further, the EPAA and EPCA
policies increased United States dependence on foreign
sources, since the entitlements program provided a subsidy to
imported crude oil. 33
30. For a detailed discussion of the costs to industry and taxpayers of compliance
and enforcement of petroleum regulations, see MacAvoy, supra note 2, at 39-89.
31. For a discussion of procedural problems with the current regulatory program,
see MacAvoy, supra note 2, at 91-138.
32. Id. at 143.
33. Cox & Wright, The Effects of Crude Oil Price Controls, Entitlements and
Taxes on Refined Product Prices and Energy Independence, 54 LND ECON. 1-15 (Feb.
1978).
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Morici's analysis concluded that the benefits of price regu-
lations to petroleum consumers and refiners were outweighed
by the costs to crude oil producers and the loss of efficiency in
production. 3' The cost of transferring windfall profits from
crude producers to product consumers and refiners yields a
negative net welfare gain. Consumers obviously benefit from
lower product prices and higher consumption levels as long as
refineries pass on their lower crude costs, which have not been
fully dissipated by higher refinery costs. However, Morici con-
cluded that this regulated system has the effect of subsidizing
crude oil imports and reallocating domestic resources to less
efficient users.
IV. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONTROLS
This analysis first will employ a simple static supply and
demand model to examine the impact of EPCA-type price con-
trols on consumers, producers, and the international oil mar-
kets. Assuming that oil supplies are not perfectly inelastic,3
which is consistent with both theoretical analysis and empiri-
cal work, Figure One illustrates the impacts of EPCA-type
price controls on oil demand and supply.3
Figure 1
Static Representation of Crude Oil
Supply and Demand
SUPPLY DEMAND
Price
----------
A B Quantity
World Price
...... .... .......
, .Average Price
Upper Tier Price
A' B' Quantity
Price
34. Morici, Jr., The Benefits and Costs of Crude Oil Price Regulations, 3 J. EN.
& DEv. 366-77 (Spring 1978).
35. I.e., that oil supplies do not respond to changes in oil price. This could be
demonstrated graphically as a vertical line in Figure One.
36. This analysis relies on the work of Cox and Wright, supra note 33, which shows
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In the case of producers subject to price controls, the upper
tier price will equal the marginal cost of production, a figure
normally used 'by producers to compute the profit-maximizing
production rate. Given a positively sloped supply curve, pro-
duction will be lower under price controls than in the absence
of price controls. This production loss equals B minus A on the
supply function. However, the dynamic solution discussed in
the next section may yield far different results.
Because of the exclusion of enhanced recovery techniques
in the EPCA, the upper tier price controls are more likely to
retard exploration and development of new oil properties than
they are to deter investment in enhanced recovery. The new
regulations regarding stripper well pricing may induce some
suppliers with relatively low producing properties to retard pro-
duction for a period of time in order to receive stripper well
classification and therefore maximize profits in the long run.
These types of exceptions in the current regulations tend to
alter the simple static analysis presented supra; they are, how-
ever, relatively small when compared to overall production
magnitudes.
The impact on oil demand is straightforward when using
the static model illustrated in Figure One. Since consumers
base their consumption decisions on the average oil price, their
oil demand will be greater than the level implied by the world
oil price. In this figure, demand increases by the amount B'
minus A'. However, there is an additional impact on the de-
mand curve caused by the crude oil price regulations, which
alter the shape of the demand curve, making it relatively more
inelastic above the average price than would be the case other-
wise. This is due to the fact that if world oil prices increase by
1% for example, the average price to the consumer increases by
somewhat less than 1%, because of the weighting of domestic
and imported oil. Therefore, the demand curve becomes rela-
tively more inelastic above the average price than the simple
static model would suggest. To summarize in hard figures, the
current EPCA price controls impose a wealth transfer from
producers to consumers which Montgomery estimates will
amount to approximately $2 billion by 1985.11
that controls have reduced total, average, and marginal crude oil costs, and therefore,
product prices.
37. W. D. Montgomery, The Transition to Uncontrolled Crude Oil Prices (unpub-
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Price controls also have a diversified effect on the interna-
tional oil market. The effect on imports is the sum of the pro-
duction supply effect and demand response of (B-A) + (B'-A')
in Figure One, which translates into a direct additional de-
mand for OPEC oil. This is further illustrated in Figure Two,
where the demand for OPEC oil is shown with and without
price controls (curves A and B, respectively). As already dem-
onstrated, price controls tend to make the demand curve for oil
more inelastic above the average price, as shown by curve A in
Figure Two. This effect is also relevant when examining the
supply curve for OPEC oil, where a 1% change in the world oil
price will cause less than a 1% change in the average price
facing customers. This effect would clearly impact the profit
maximizing price that OPEC would set; however, the static
model will not indicate in what direction OPEC would adjust
its prices to maximize profits.
Figure 2
The Demand for OPEC Oil
Price
--------- .... ------------------- Market Price
-------------- -------------- Average Price
A-With Price Controls
B-Without Price Controls
Quantity
lished paper presented at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Conference on
Public Regulation, Washington, D.C., Dec. 11, 1977).
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Another possible international consequence of price con-
trols is that they might tend to create demand competition
among the oil-consuming nations, causing more rapid deple-
tion of the world's supply of crude. Since price controls in the
United States tend to increase imports, OPEC must deplete its
resources faster than it might otherwise, in order to meet this
demand." This action would effectively leave less oil available
to other consuming countries in later years, which might create
an incentive for them to impose their own price controls in
competition with the United States in order to maintain their
share of consumption. The result, other factors remaining con-
stant, would be a more rapid depletion of reserves.
For any finite resource the timing of extraction is critical
to the producer, since it represents one of the most important
variables in the profit maximization calculation. Therefore, a
dynamic analysis model must focus on the timing of extraction
and on price expectations. To the present, there have been no
theoretical analyses of the behavior of the petroleum industry
under imposed price paths, particularly when these paths are
highly uncertain. A few possible solutions to the dynamic prob-
lem can be suggested, but these should not be construed as
definitive or exhaustive of the possibilities.
If the controlled price is held constant in real terms, as-
suming prices are known with certainty, initial production
would be lower than could be expected absent controls. How-
ever, total production continues to increase over time, as de-
picted in Figure Three by the areas under triangles OAA' and
OBB'. We assume that the areas under both production curves
OAA' and OBB' are equal, implying identical total reserves
under either production curve. However, it is highly likely that
total reserves would be lower in the controlled price situation,
since the level of recoverable reserves is also a direct function
of price. Therefore, the most likely case is that curve OCC'
would be the more accurate representation of production in the
absence of price controls.
Montgomery has shown also that if controlled prices are
38. This assumes that OPEC has excess supply production capacity, which is
presently the case. However, if this capacity disappears, the excess demand would
serve to raise the world oil price for all consuming nations. At that point the U.S.
effectively would be paying for its price controls through foreign exchange differentials
and other macroeconomic occurrences.
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increasing so that the difference between the world price and
controlled prices is greater than the real rate of interest, re-
sources will be depleted sooner than under the controlled situa-
tion, as shown in the second chart of Figure Three. 9 Again, it
is reasonable to assume that the total level of reserves is a
function of the level of the controlled price. Since the controlled
price remains below the market price, the dotted line EE'
would be the most likely solution if price controls were lifted.
It is important to note that FF' could well lie below the market
price solution in most years since this line is determined by the
price/recoverable reserve relationship. Thus, the final solution
to the dynamic problem is even more uncertain.
Figure 341"
A Dynamic Representation of
Oil Production
Production Paths When Market and Controlled Prices are
Constant
C
A "", B Market PricesProduction B '
Probable Market Impact
When Reserves Are Considered
do Controlled Prices
0 A' C' B' Time
39. Montgomery, note 37 supra.
40. Taken from id., with the exception of the dotted lines depicting the impact of
price on available reserves.
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Figure 3, Cont'd
Production Paths With Rising Market Prices
F
ProuctonE Controlled Prices
D .
Probable Market Impact When
Reserves Are Considered
Market Prices
0 D' E' F' Time
Since the life of a particular field usually runs between
twenty and thirty years, price expectations are crucial in deter-
mining the extraction rate. In the previous analysis, it was
assumed that these price paths were known with certainty.
However, one of the major impacts of price controls, especially
in recent years, has been to add uncertainty to the determina-
tion of the controlled price. The regulations outlined earlier
have changed dramatically in just the last five years, and there
is no reason for producers to expect any more certainty in the
regulatory environment in the future. This instability is im-
posed on top of the uncertainty introduced by OPEC in their
price-setting decisions. The combination of these factors could
alter the analysis presented drastically. For example, if produ-
cers expected controls to be removed some time far in the fu-
ture, and at the same time expect OPEC to raise prices rapidly,
the profit-maximizing solution might be to withhold current
production. While apparently this is not presently taking
place, it is not difficult to conceive its occurrence in the future.
Figure Four suggests how this uncertainty would alter any ex-
pected extraction path (a solid line) with a probability distri-
bution (dotted lines) drawn about this line.
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Figure 4
Production When the Controlled Price is Uncertain
Production
' . ... 2.: :..
Time
The international implications of the dynamic analysis are
somewhat similar to those of the static model presented above.
The demand reaction to price controls in the dynamic and
static solutions would be identical, however, the dynamic
production decisions would tend to alter the position of OPEC.
As long as slack OPEC production capacity exists, the dynamic
solution would force the excess-capacity members of OPEC to
alter their production in response to the extraction rates of the
non-OPEC producers, in order to maintain the world oil price
at the level they desire. If the spare OPEC production capacity
disappeared, the dynamic production decisions of the non-
OPEC producers would directly affect the world oil price and,
therefore, add an additional variable in the profit-maximizing
decisions of both the non-OPEC producers and of OPEC itself.
Thus, controls can be seen not only to influence domestic deci-
sions, but to impose significant costs on international markets.
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